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THE POLITICO-RHETORICAL CLIMATE OF THE
KOREAN DECISION
Robert M. Ezzell
Wliile analysts disagree about the quality of the Truman administration's
initial decision to deploy U.S. troops in Korea in June, 1950, there is a
general consensus among historians and political scientists that the more am
bitious decision in October, 1950, authorizing the pursuit of North Korean
troops above the 38th parallel with the goal of political reunification of
Korea, was particularly poor.i Janis, following Neustadt, suggests that the
decision was poor primarily because it was risky. But unlike! Neustadt, he
sees the risks mainly as military—a position from which Neustadt specifi
cally demurs.2
Janis assigns the cause of this poor, because risky, decision to that curious
constellation of conditions which he characterizes as "grouptliink": ". . .a
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a
cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action."® Such a
mentality no doubt exists, especially in decision-making groups which are
constrained to conformity by a legacy of previous commitments or where
the power and ethos of one or more of the members is sufficient to elicit a
docile consensus from the remainder.
With regard to the Truman administration's decisions about Korea, how
ever, the word groupthink" is but a bit of locutionary legerdemain mas
querading the really crucial question: viz., why did a decision-making body,
whose previous rhetoric, commitments, policies, and practices had con
sistently relegated Korea to a marginal status, suddenly decide to commit
itself to intervention and the admittedly risky expansion above the 38th
parallel. I contend that the decisions may have been risky (especially the
second one) but not poor, and that the prevailing climate was such thai
they were "necessary," given the decision-makers' perception of the politico-
rhetorical parameters within which they operated. In order to understand
these decisions, one must first be familiar with administration policies at
the time and the fierce opposition to them from the Right. So stridently
were countervaihng policies set forth by Right-wing politicos, in fact, that
they rhetorically preempted the official policies.
One of the most widely cited scholars of Korea, Jolm W. Spanier, has
delineated in considerable detail the domestic political climate during the
Robert M. Ezzell is Assistant Professor of Homiletics at Pittsburgh Theological
Seminary.
^ Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972),
p. 55.
^Cf. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: New American
Library, 1960), pp. 121-122.
"Janis, op. cit., p. 9.
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time just preceding the North Korean invasion of South KoreaA Indeed,
he sums up my bias in terse terms: "The Korean War was from the begin
ning deeply embroiled in American politics."®
In the several years prior to the Korean War, the Democratic adminis
tration had directed its foreign policy energies to Europe, primarily through
NATO and the Marshall Plan. Since Europe was perceived to be the critical
area in which to blimt any additional USSR imperiahsm, both these pro
grams were designed to retard further Soviet encroachments. We were
still very insecure about Europe, and the Berlin blockade of 1948 exacer
bated our anxiety, becoming an objet de resistance. All was not desperate,
however. Some encouragement must have been gained with the June, 1948
announcement of Yugoslavia's expulsion by the Cominform from the Com
munist bloc—on the grounds of ideological heresy!
If we were myopically preoccupied with Europe in our foreign policy,
we were nonchalant, if not insouciant, toward Asia in general and Korea
in particular. The reason for this was simple enough. The Administration
gave top priority to the deterrence of the Soviet Union, which it wanted to
be able to stop in case of a global war. Relying on its best military intelli
gence, it concluded that Korea, and indeed Asia in general, was of little
strategic importance in the event of a major conflict with Russia. Thus,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Eisenhower as unofficial chairman, had
recommended in late 1947 the removal of the 45,000 U.S. troops then sta
tioned in Korea.® Spanier adduces three reasons for this recommendation
by the Joint Chiefs. First, because of cutbacks in military expenditures,
the military wanted to concentrate its resources in high priority areas of
major strategic importance. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that it
was the Republican-dominated 80th Congress which had imposed these
cuts on the military budget with the intention of providing thereby a twenty
per cent income tax reduction.'^
The second reason for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea
was the Joint Chiefs' preoccupation with total war. "This left Korea mili
tarily dispensable within the global pattern of American security, since in
an all-out war the fate of Korea would be decided in other theaters of war;
Soviet occupation of Korea would not raise Korea's strategic significance
since the peninsula could be neutralized by American air and sea power."®
Third, the Joint Chiefs feared that the ". . . lack of progress toward a free and
independent Korea might in the coming months give rise to violent disorders
which would place the occupation forces in an untenable position." Fur
thermore, the South Koreans had exerted considerable pressure for the re
moval of our troops, and the Russians had withdrawn her troops from North
Korea. Thus, not to remove ours would have placed the U.S. in an indefensi
ble propaganda position.®
Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave public expression and Administra
tion sanction to this policy in his celebrated speech before the National
'John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965), chaps. 1-3. Glenn D. Paige, The
Korean Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1968), chaps. 2—3.
° Spanier, op. ait., p. 41.
® Ibid., pp. 16-17.
' Ibid., pp. 17-18.
® Ibid., p. 18.
° Ibid., p. 19.
4
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol12/iss2/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 27
Press Club on January 12, 1950, in which he defined the American defense
perimeter in the Pacific. "It ran, he said, from the Aleutians (outside the
Kurdes) to Japan, through tlie Ryukus (Okinawa) to the Philippines. In
this strategic island chain, the United States possessed immediate responsi
bilities and the power to act. Beyond this defense perimeter, however, the
United States had no specific obligations. Washington could not, therefore,
guarantee areas lying outside this American chain against military attack;
proposals to this effect were neither sensible nor necessary within the 'realm
of practical relationship.'
In the few months preceding Acheson's speech, two events of considerable
long-range consequence for American foreign policy occurred. They were
the explosion of an atomic bomb by the Russians in August, 1949 and the
Communist takeover in China in October, 1949. In light of these, Acheson's
rhetoric is all the more remarkable. Indeed, he went on to suggest that
Russia's and China's interests were inherently incompatible. He viewed the
Communist coup in China as a Nationalist movement whose interests would
cause it to continue its traditional geopolitical conflict with Russia.^^ Should
Mao not become another Tito, as Acheson envisioned he would, the result
would be a loss of support from the Chinese people. In either case, the
United States would benefit, but only if it would disengage itself from
Chinese politics and dissociate itself from Chiang's exiled government on
Formosa, lest it incur the pique of Peking and the Chinese people.
The Administration, with concurrence from the military, fully expected
Formosa to fall to the Chinese Communists before the end of 1950. In fact,
in December, 1949, the State Department had prepared and distributed a
guide for use by information officers charged with the task of interpreting
the fall of Formosa. It was to aid them in countering any "false impres
sions" that the loss of Formosa would seriously harm the interests of the
U.S. or any other country opposed to communism.
Although our official position toward Korea was different from that to
ward Formosa, in that we were formally committed to its support, our
policies of troop withdrawal and reduction in aid, and the Joint Chiefs' dis
claimer of Korea's strategic significance all contributed to the impression
that our support was more nominal than real. As Glenn D. Paige says:
"Despite declarations of support for the Republic of Korea, American words
and actions in early 1950 gave the impression both in Korea and abroad
that the United States government was not deeply committed to its sur-
vival."^^ Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, was asked in an interview published on May 5, 1950, if he
thought the suggestion that we abandon Korea was going to be seriously
considered. He replied:
I'm afraid it's going to be seriously considered because I'm afraid it's
going to happen, whether we want it to or not. I'm for Korea. We're
" Ibid., p. 20.
"^Ihid., p. 52. Acheson accurately anticipated the Sino-Soviet split which be
gan in 1956, although he erred in his assessment of the ideological nature of the
aligmnents of that spHt. Far from being another Tito as Acheson expected, Mao
was the leftist ideologue in the dispute, charging Khrushchev and the Kremlin
with rightist revisionism.
^Zfoid., p. 53.
"Ibid., p. 56.
"Paige, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
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trying to help her; we're appropriating money now to help her. But
South Korea is cut right across by this line (the Thirty-eighth Parallel)—
north of it are the communists with access to the mainland— and Russia
is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion she
can overrun Korea just like she will probably overrun Formosa when
she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.is
Paige, commenting on Connallys statement, notes that it ". . . contributed
further to the impression that the Administration was prepared to accept
the loss of the Republic of Korea as well as the Republic of China on For
mosa."^®
In light of these speeches, public statements, and policies of the Adminis
tration, "groupthink" can hardly account for their reversal a few months
later by the very people who made them. For beginning June 25, 1950,
this group was to make decisions, in concert with the UN, to intervene on
behalf of the Republic of Korea to restore the status quo ante, i.e., push
the North Korean troops back above the 38th parallel, deploy the Seventh
Fleet in a blockade to prevent Communist China's takeover of Formosa
and, after MacArthur's successful invasion at Inchon, to authorize U.S.
troops to proceed above the 38th parallel with an escalated goal of reunify
ing Korea.
To account for this reversal, one must look again at the domestic political
scene and see the ways in which the Administration's policies were politi
cally preempted by a countervailing rhetoric from the Right, particularly in
the period from January to June, 1950.
The year 1950 was an election year and the Republicans were still re
cuperating from the trauma of their surprising defeat in 1948. They were
fervently searching for issues and policies where the Democratic Adminis
tration's position might be vulnerable to attack; they found a poignant
issue in the Administration's Asian policy and converted it into a cause
celebre.
The State Department information document on China, alluded to above,
was leaked by General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in January, 1950
and was immediately seized upon by Congressional Republicans as the
occasion for a scathing denunciation of the Administration's decision to let
Formosa fall to the Communists. Led by Senators William Knowland,
Robert Taft, and Joseph McCarthy, and with public support from former
President Hoover, the Republicans accused the Democrats of selling out to
Communism in the case of China, just as they had done with the Eastern
European countries at Yalta in 1945. Concomitant charges were made that
the government in general and the State Department in particular were
populated with Communists and those sympathetic to the Communist
cause. As Spanier says: "The Republican thesis was simplicity itself:
America's Chinese pohcy had ended in Commrmist control of the Chinese
mainland; the State Department and the Administration leaders were re
sponsible for the formulation and execution of policy; thus the government
must be filled with Communists and 'Communist sympathizers' who 'tailored'
American policy to advance the Soviet Union's global aims."^®
^ Cited in Paige, p. 68.
Ibid., p. 68.
" Spanier, op. ait., p. 57.
^ Paige, op. cit., p. 37.
^ Spanier, op. cit., p. 59.
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The chief reason the Republicans were able, rhetorically, to exploit this
issue so effectively was that it appealed directly to the American people's
feeling of frustration with the contemporary Cold War policy of contain
ment. That policy clashed with a mentality deeply rooted in the average
American s psyche. It is the mentality which believes that if you have an
enemy, you should fight until you force him to surrender in order that you
can peacefully get back to those desired normal routines. In this Weltan
schauung, containment and coexistence are unacceptable aliens, confounding
our categories by adding ambiguity to the facile distinctions of friend or
foe.^"
To cast the problem a different way, the onus was on the Administration
for not educating the public, rhetorically, to the kinds of policies which were
mandated by the current international political and military situation. How
ever, it is a moot point whether such efforts, even if attempted, would have
succeeded, since the time span in which to do the job was relatively short
before the Administration was put on the defensive. And, as Walter Lipp-
mann has observed, ". . . any democratic government has a difficult time
managing foreign affairs because it must cope with public opinion that is
years behind the time."2i Thus it was precisely through an anachronistic
rhetoric that the Republicans were able to capitalize on public opinion
which was still years behind current policies.
That they were eminently successful in their efforts can hardly he
doubted. Truman's popularity in the Gallup polls had dropped drastically,
from a 69 per cent approval of his leadership in January, 1949, to a 37 per
cent approval in June, 1950, prior to tlie Korean decision—a drop of al
most 50 per cent! "The Gallup Poll analysts, aware of the sensitivity to
events of this kind of political opinion, speculated that the decline in the
President's popularity might have been associated with the prolonged coal
strike that had occurred during the winter, with increased international
tension, with 'Gommunist gains in Asia,' and with 'constant criticism leveled
at the State Department.' "22 Also, in May of 1950, the polls showed that
the American public was more acquainted with Senator McGarthy's charges
against the State Department than with any other domestic issue.
Only 14 per cent of the persons questioned were uninformed. Of the
remainder, 39 per cent thought that the charges would be beneficial for
the country; 29 per cent considered them harmful; 16 per cent had no
opinion about their effects. Republican voters tended to have attitudes
more favorable to the charges (50 per cent considered them good; 22
per cent thought them hannful) while Democratic voters were more
evenly divided in their judgements (35 per cent thought them good; 33
per cent considered them injurious) .23
The upshot of this Republican rhetorical victory was that it forced the
Truman Administration, for political reasons, to reverse its avowed and
preferred policies. The political and rhetorical climate had changed so that
the Democrats were put in a position of having to prove their virility:
™ For an excellent discussion of this American attitude toward war, see Spanier,
cp. cit., pp. 2-14.
Joseph H. deRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Colum
bus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Co., 1968), p. 345.
Paige, op. cit., p. 45.
""Ibid., p. 46.
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Indeed, in the general atmosphere of distrust and suspicion which the
Republicans had first created and then exploited, the Democrats could
not have afforded to discard Chiang completely or to establish any re
lations with Communist China. The Republican explanation of the fall
of China gained widespread acceptance as revelations of Communist es
pionage became known; perhaps the government and the State Depart
ment were full of subversives. Harry Truman's outright dismissal of
legitimate criticisms of existing security regulations as 'red herrings'
only furthered the acceptance of the belief that the United States was
being betrayed from within. To have abandoned Chiang and established
diplomatic relations with Communist China under these circumstances
would have been tantamount to political suicide,
It is in the context of this political climate that I would interpret the de
cision to intervene in Korea, although it was certainly not inconsistent with
our policy of containment. But given the rhetorical climate which prevailed,
it was a politically necessary decision. The subsequent decision to escalate
the effort was a regressive capitulation to the all-out win and total surrender
mentahty. But it, too, though militarily risky, was probably politically neces
sary, because that military mentality had attained rhetorical ascendance,
aided and abetted by the enormous ethos of General Douglas MacArthur.
According to Janis, one of the characteristics of "groupthink" is "deflec
tion of anger away from the group." He interprets President Truman's
anger upon discovering that the presence and strength of the Chinese Com-
mrmists in North Korea was far more formidable than he had been led to
believe as an example of this deflection of anger. Instead of directing his
anger at those whom Janis says should have been its obvious objects, Tru
man rather turned it toward Republican newspaper publishers and other
Repubhcans.2® I would suggest that his anger was not displaced at all.
Petulant and puerile for a President it may have been, but not displaced.
For Harry Truman's political instincts were such that he knew who had
politically victimized him and his Asian policies; and who knows what might
have happened if he had not been pressured politically into a more belli
cose, anti-Communist position in Asia?
Spanier, op. cit., p. 61.
^ Op. cit., p. 67.
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WATERGATE: CRISIS BY DECISION
Richard E. Caplan
In August of 1974, the collection of "horrors" known as Watergate reached
tlie level of a national crisis, destroying the ability of ex-President Nixon to
govern. Criminal cases have been generated against forty men, including
two Attorneys General, two Cabinet Secretaries and over a dozen White
House staff members.i During the last months of the Nixon Presidency no
significant effort was made to deal with national problems. Confidence
in government and the future of the nation had been replaced by cynicism.
What was called a "third-rate burglary attempt"^ had become a national
crisis. This crisis was not created by an act of natural disaster or territorial
desire, but through the calm and reserved process of discussion. Watergate
was created by rational men seeking to solve problems in groups. It be
came a crisis because these men made it one through their decisions to ini
tiate plans involving a great amount of risk.^ I offer that Watergate can
best be understood as a rhetorical event through the application of the theory
of shift toward risk. This essay will apply the theory of risky shift to the
Watergate crisis in an attempt to understand the decisions that led to
this crisis.
The theory of shift toward risk contends that decisions made by groups
are more risky than decisions made by average individuals.^ The evidence
for this theory is highly consistent. It has been found to be vahd in a variety
of situations and with a variety of subjects. The theory appears to be gen-
eralizable. There is clear and distinct evidence that decisions following dis
cussion exhibit greater risk than individual decisions.
The commonly held belief tliat group decisions foster conservatism must
be questioned. Whyte, The Organization Man, argues that committees pro
duce pressures for conformity, s Research indicates that committees do not
seem to produce conservative and mediocre decisions. The social influence
witliin groups seems to produce ideas involving greater risk.
Three explanations of this phenomenon have been offered: first, that
risk-taking is a cultural value; second, that the most risky individual is the
most influential in a group; third, that the responsibility for tlie risk is dif
fused between the group members. All three factors contribute to risky
shift; however, the diffusion of responsibility has the greatest experimental
support.
The Watergate crisis would have been incompletely understood, like
Richard E. Caplan is a graduate assistant at Wayne State University, Detroit,
Michigan, where he is completing his Ph.D. in communication, rhetoric and pub
lic address. The author wishes to thank Bernard Brock for his guidance in the
preparation of this article.
^ "Was Justice Finally Done?," Newsiveek, January 13, 1975, p. 19.
^ Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, news conference. Key Bis-
cayne, Florida, 19 June 1972.
^ "Watergate: An End of an Epoch," Ramparts, August-September 1973, p. 16.
* See Mervin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com
pany, 1971), pp. 73-82, and D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Group Dynamics:
Research and Theory, 3d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 430-442
for a review of risky shift.
= W. H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Simon & Schuster
1956).
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most other historical events, except for two critical decisions. First, Richard
Nixon's decision to record all Presidential conversations as a historical record
of his administration. Second, Nixon's decision, under pressure from the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Ameri
can people, to release 1,308 pages of edited transcript.
Analysis of the transcripts should reveal elements in the decision-making
discussions that brought about the crisis. It can be seen that the decision
to use clandestine techniques for information gathering was itself risky. A
number of options were available for an intelligence operation, among them
the plan that produced the Watergate break-in. This, the most risky plan,
was accepted. The decision to continue the risk of a growing cover-up was
made in the context of these previous decisions of great risk.
On March 21, 1973, the clandestine White House electronic recording
system recorded John Dean's explanation to President Nixon of how Water
gate started. Dean relates that H. R. Haldeman, the White House Chief
of Staff, instructed him to set up "a perfectly legitimate campaign intelli
gence operation."® Dean asked John J. Caulfield to prepare a plan that
would involve "normal infiltration, buying information from secretaries and
all that sort of thing.'"'' Caulfield and his plan were rejected by John Ehrlich-
man, the President's adviser on domestic affairs, and John N. Mitchell,
former Attorney General and the director of the Committee for the Re-elec
tion of the President. Dean felt that this was a mistake because Caulfield
was an "incredibly cautious person."® Mitchell suggested Gordon Liddy
as a replacement for Caulfield. Dean reminded the President that Liddy
had been involved in the clandestine break-in at Dr. Lewis Fielding's of
fice, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The transcript quotes Dean:
So I came over and Liddy laid out a million dollar plan that was the
most incredible thing I have ever laid my eyes on: all in codes, and in
volved black bag operations, kidnapping, providing prostitutes to weaken
the opposition, bugging, mugging teams . . .
.  . . And so Liddy was told to go back to the drawing board and come
up with something realistic. So there was a second meeting . . . they
were discussing again bugging, kidnapping and the Hke."
The President was then told that at this point Dean stopped Liddy's pres
entation as such things should not be discussed in the office of the Attorney
General. Dean then reported that he threw out Liddy. He thought that
this was the end of it, but later concluded that the people at the committee
started to push for infonnation. A variation of Liddy's plan was ultimately
accepted by this group.
As of March 21, 1973, it was Dean's belief that a plan had been ap
proved by a group headed by Mitchell, at the Committee to Re-elect the
President. The plan involved infiltrating, bugging, and "all this sort of
thing."^® The plan that originated as a "normal" information-gathering
operation led by a cautious John Caulfield shifted to an incredibly risky
plan developed by Liddy.
° The White House Transcripts, Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversa
tions to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by Presi
dent Richard Nixon (New York; Bantam Books, Inc., 1974), p. 134.
' Ibid.
' Ibid.
'Ibid., p. 136.
""Ibid., p. 138.
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On April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman briefed the President about events lead
ing to the break-in. Ehrlichman believed that this was the first full briefing
that the President had had. This conversation took place in the Executive
Office Building and was recorded by the White House recording system.
This briefing gives evidence of how the final decision was made. Charles
W. Colson, special counsel for the President, was nervous about Liddy's
plan and felt that Mitchell was nervous too. However, Colson got the
thing moving. A meeting was set up for final approval. Ehrlichman states:
Around the end of March [1971], Magruder and LaRue went to Key
Biscayne where John Mitchell was . . .
They presented to Mitchell Liddy's final proposal . . .
It involved bugging three places—Watergate, McGovem Headquar
ters and the Fontaine Bleau.
In the conversation, Mitchell orally approved it."
A plan involving the bugging of Democratic National Committee Head
quarters was accepted. Mitchell and Colson were uneasy about the plan as
it entailed a great amount of risk. There was a shift from a cautious plan
to a risky plan, from cautious Caulfield to risky Liddy. The plan for the
clandestine break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic National Com
mittee was inherently more risky than other information-gathering tech
niques.
Bad luck alone will not explain what happened. No matter how one in
terprets the evidence, the testimony and the transcripts, Watergate from the
start involved risk. Statistics indicate that the risk involved in burglary is
overwhelming. One out of five burglaries end in an arrest. The Watergate
burglars were involved in at least seven burglaries and attempted bur
glaries. With each attempt the probability of capture increased. On May
23, 1973, former New York City policeman Anthony T. Ulaslwicz testified
before the Senate Select Committee as to the method the Re-election Com
mittee was using to gather intelligence information. When questioned by
Senator Howard Baker, he stated:
I will tell you, any old retired man in the New York City Police Depart
ment who would become involved in a thing like that. . . he would not
have walked in with an army, that is for sure. . .
He probably would have walked in like any decent, common-looking
citizen. . ."
Burglary is a dangerous business even for tliose who are expert in it. The
Watergate burglars were not experts in espionage. Liddy put together a
"James Bond" scenario. There were other ways of gathering information.
There were legitimate ways that Dean had talked about. Ulaslwicz felt
"Ibid., pp. 380-81.
" Max Ways, "Watergate as a Case Study in Management," Fortune, November,
1973, pp. 109-111.
" Seven burglaries or attempted burglaries have been connected to Liddy and
Hunt; however, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward suggest there may have been
more. See Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, All the President's Men (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
" Anthony T. Ulaslwicz, testimony before the Senate Select Committee, in
Watergate: Chronology of a Crisis, ed. by William Dickinson (Washington;
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.) p. 180.
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that experts wouldn't go about it the way Liddy and his group did. The
President stated on March 21st in the transcripts that the "people around
here are not pros at this sort of thing."^® The risk involved in the Watergate
clandestine activity was extremely high. Yet the decision was made to ac
cept one of Liddy's plans.
Why would such intelligent and reserved men make such a risky decision?
These men were not experienced with clandestine activities. Their candi
date, Richard Nixon, was so far ahead of his opponent it seemed foolish to
bother. I conclude that since the decision was made by a group, shift toward
risk is a logical explanation. There were a number of options open to gather
information: no plan could have been accepted; Caulfield's cautious plan
could have been accepted; Liddy's plan could have been accepted. There
was a shift from the Caulfield plan to a consensus for the Liddy plan. The
plan with the highest risk was finally implemented.
The decision to accept Liddy's plan reflects the philosophy and decision-
making pattern that influenced later decisions. Apparently decisions in the
Nixon Administration were made by discussions of selected advisers. The
shift toward risk can clearly be seen in the cover-up that followed the June
17, 1972, break-in. The transcripts are evidence of what took place in
these decision-making discussions that led to the payment of hush money to
Hunt and the continuation of the cover-up. The two Presidential conversa
tions of March 21, 1973, concern the establishment of a conspiracy to ob
struct justice.
The first of the March 21st conversations took place in the President's
Oval Office at 10:12 a.m. The President and John Dean began the dis
cussion and, at the President's request, H. R. Haldeman joined the meeting.
The second conversation took place in the Executive Office Buflding at
5:20 p.m. Present were the President, Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
The conversations evolved within the context of the sentencing of the seven
men convicted in the burglary and evidence that Judge Sirica was trying to
pressure the burglars into imphcating higher-ups. In addition, E. Howard
Hunt was making demands for legal fees and family support, threatening
to expose White House involvement.
Nixon, Haldeman, Dean and Ehrhchman discussed and debated a num
ber of plans to deal with this situation. There were two basic plans formu
lated. The first, suggested by Dean, was that a cover-up was a cancer close
to the Presidency and that it should be cut out. The second plan proposed
by the President was to continue the cover-up. The continuation of the
cover-up would have bought time, while Dean's plan of disclosure would
have ended the scandal. Of the two plans discussed, the one offered by the
President obviously required greater risk. Dean pointed the risk out to the
President. He stated:
Basically, it is because (1) we are being blackmailed (2) people are
going to have to start perjuring themselves very quickly that have not
had to perjure themselves to protect other people in the line. And there
is no assurance—-that that won't bust."
The cover-up was growing. Blackmail and perjury were involved, and
above all there was no assurance that it wouldn't "bust." In fact, the likeli
hood of containment or a cover-up "busting" was extremely great.
Blackmail was the immediate problem, but Dean advised the President
' Transcripts, p. 146.
' Ibid., p. 134.
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that it would continue as long as the burglars were in prison. Dean states
that this would "compound the obstruction of justice."^'^ It would cost
money and it would be dangerous. The people in the White House were
not experienced in subterfuge. Dean's solution was to cut the losses and
minimize any further growth of the cover-up.
The President did not show any interest in Dean's plan. Instead of want
ing to cut out the cancer he wanted to plug the holes in the cover-up. The
President asked how much it would cost. Dean estimated that it would cost
a million dollars over the next two years. President Nixon stated:
We could get that. On the money, if you need the money, you could get
that. You could get a million dollars. You could get it in cash. I know
where it could be gotten. It is not easy, but it could be done.^
The President thus rejects a plan of disclosure and cutting losses for a
cover-up plan. His plan was to "keep the cap on the bottle."^® Dean re
turns to his allusion toward a growing cancer. The conversation indicates
that the President was aware of facts of the situation. Dean explained that
the number of people who were aware of a cover-up was great and would
continue to grow. Hunt was threatening to involve Ehrhchman if he was
not given $120,000 for attorney fees and personal expenses. Liddy, McCord
or the Cubans could blow at any time. In addition, the lawyers had knowl
edge that could blow the lid off. Hunt's wife knew a lot before her death,
along with the wives of some of the other aides. If any of these minor
players talked, it would blow the lid off the cover-up. President Nixon shows
his understanding of the risk when he observes:
.  . . the secretaries, the assistants know all of this. The principals may be
hard as a rock but you never know when they, or some of their people
may crack.'"
Dean stated that this plan was "a very high risk."^^ Some were bound to
break with so many people involved. A cover-up plan was full of "soft
spots," and if it blew it would involve the President in a cover-up situa-
tion.22
Dean did not have a complete plan but it was his feeling that the growth
of the cover-up had to be stopped. He suggested to the President that the
Attorney General could be told that for the first time all tire pieces were
together and another Grand Jury could be called. Dean states:
There are two routes. One is to figure out how to cut the losses and mini
mize the hmnan impact: get you up and out and away from it in any
way. In a way it would have never come back to haunt you.^"
Dean wanted to disclose the information about the cover-up. This would
end Watergate once and for all. It would not come back to involve the
President.
The President's plan was one to continue with the cover-up. President
Nixon was a fighter. He felt that it was better to "stone wall" it rather than
" Ibid., p. 146.
"^Ibid., pp. 146-147.
"^Ibid., p. 148.
''Ibid., p. 161.
""Ibid., p. 177.
"Ibid., p. 151.
"Ibid., p. 154.
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quit. The problem for the President was not adverse pubhcity but the dan
ger of criminal liability to his aides and members of the committee. This
would require a million dollars and more to keep the burglars silent until
the administration had left office. The story would then come out but no
one would care. Then some form of pardon or parole could have been
worked out. The first thing that had to be done was a payment of $120,000
to Hunt to get him to hold.^^
At this point, Haldeman joined the meeting. Haldeman was very sup
portive of the President's plan to continue the cover-up. It was suggested
that Watergate be put on national security grounds. Haldeman states that
"it absolutely was" on security grounds.^® The discussion then returned to
hush money. The President attempted to evaluate the two plans. Halde
man argued that in a plan of full disclosure the administration is going to
look like "dopes."2® Dean countered that the paying of blackmail would
put them in "great jeopardy, and they "are chancing a very high risk
for perjury."^® Haldeman pressured the President into a decision to pay off
Hunt. The transcripts state:
President—To hell with it!
Dean—• They're going to stonewall it, as it now stands. Excepting
Hunt. That's why his threat.
Haldeman—^It's Hunt opportunity.
President—That's why for your immediate things you have no choice
but to come up with the $120,000, or whatever it is. . .
In the second conversation of March 21st, there is considerable interac
tion between Haldeman, Ehrhchman and Dean. Dean brings into the con
versation the fact that a cover-up would not be an ultimate solution. He
again returns to the analogy of cleaning out a cancer.®® Ehrlichman pro
posed that a cover-up plan lets the President control the situation better.
Haldeman's reaction to Dean's return to the cancer analogy and the full
disclosure plan were very negative. He states:
Well, see if we go your route, you can't draw the line someplace and
say—
If you take your move and it goes slightly awry, you have a certainty,
almost, of Magruder going to jail, Chapin going to jail, and you going
to jad, and probably me going to jail.^'^
At the end of this meeting the President made no change in his earher de
cision to pay Hunt to keep quiet, continue the cover-up and engage in a
conspiracy to obstruct justice.
There was a greater risk in the President's plan, but it was accepted. The
President and his advisers committed themselves to continuing the cover-
up. The next day McCord sent a letter to Judge Sirica which started to
blow the cover-up. The cover-up plan, although it had the most risk, was
accepted.
'''Ibid., PP 164-66.
Ibid., P- 163.
""Ibid., P- 165.
Ibid., P- 167.
^ Ibid., p. 171.
" Ibid., P- 172.
Ibid., P- 188.
"'Ibid., P- 190.
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In applying the risky shift theory to the transcripts, one can see all tliree
explanations stated previously. In this group, Haldeman seems to have
been the most influential member. In the conversations of March 21st,
Ehrlichman's reaction to Dean's plan was negative, showing passive rejec-
tion.®2 Haldeman's reaction is negative, displaying considerable aggression.
He refers to Dean in the third person to the other members of the group.
Haldeman's statements are an attempt to defeat Dean's status, thereby per
suading the others to accept the more risky alternative. Thus, it would be
expected that his influence on the group was responsible, to some degree,
for the risky shift. This can be seen from Dean's testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on June 27, 1973. Dean stated his reaction to
the behavior of Haldeman and Ehrlichman during the conversation;
I could tell that both Haldeman, and particularly Ehrlichman, were very
unhappy with my comments. I had let them very clearly know that I
was not going to participate in the matter any further. .
The shift could also be due to the preconceived expectations of the group
members to conform to the cultural values for risk-taking. The political
history of the Nixon administration was one of taking risks. It would be
expected of members of the administration to conform to risk-taking.
Finally, the diffusion of responsibility for Watergate and the cover-up could
have been responsible for the shift. No one person felt responsible for the
decision which led to the cover-up. The responsibihty was pushed off onto
other members of the group. Indeed, ex-President Nixon and his aides are
still attempting to diffuse responsibility for Watergate and the cover-up.
In the March 21st conversations between the President and his advisers,
two plans were proposed. The plan involving the greater risk was adopted.
This was due in part to the influence of the most risky individual, Halde
man, cultural pressure to conform to risk-taking, and the diffusion of re
sponsibility for the risk. The transcripts of the Presidential conversations
indicate that there was a shift of group thought toward a plan involving
greater risk.
Watergate is evidence of how government decisions are made on the
highest levels. In the Federal government, high officials have so many ac
tivities and responsibilities that they must rely on the conscience and com
petence of subordinates. This is especially true of the Presidency. Govern
ment officials must continually judge tlie quality of their decisions and the
effect of aides on those decisions. An extremely persuasive aide will have
an overly dominant role in policy making. The method in which decisions
are made will affect the outcome. There is reason to believe that decisions
made by groups of aides may be inherently more risky.
Watergate is an artifact of the decision-making method employed. De
cisions made by groups are inherently risky. Government officials are now
employing groups of aides to help make policy decisions. Watergate is an
example of what can happen when groups are given tlie task of making
decisions involving risky alternatives. It illustrates the need to be concerned
about the process as well as the substance of decision-making.
''Ibid., p. 188-189.
"Ibid., p. 189.
^'John W. Dean III, "Statement before the Senate Select Committee," in
Watergate: Chronology of a Crisis, ed. by Wilham Dickinson (Washington: Con
gressional Quarterly, Inc.) p. 187.
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MEN OF WISDOM OR BUILDERS OF BABEL A
STUDY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1787
Robert V. Fhiedenbeeg
"When you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their
joint wisdom," commented Benjamin Franklin as the Constitutional Con
vention drew to a close,
you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their pas
sions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views.
From such an Assembly can a perfect production be expected? It there
fore astonishes me. Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfec
tion as it does; and I think it wiU astonish our enemies, who are waiting
with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of
the Builders of Babel.^
Clearly, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were not
confounded like the Builders of Babel. Rather, they were able to overcome
their prejudices, passions, errors of opinion, local interests, and selfish views.
They created an enduring form of government, currently the oldest written
Constitution in use. There have been few, if any, deliberative assemblies
as remarkably suceessful as the Constitutional Convention.
Many explanations for the success of the Convention have been offered.
Indeed, it is entirely fair to suggest that no single deliberative body has
been subjected to more careful scrutiny by historians, political scientists,
lawyers, jurists, rhetoricians, and laymen than that body of men who in
1787 wrote the American Constitution.^ Yet few of the Convention's stu
dents have attempted to evaluate the rules which governed the decision-
making process in that body.^ Those rules facilitated wise decision-making
Robert V. Friedenberg is Associate Professor and Director of the Speech Com
munication Division, Department of Communication and Theatre, Miami (Ohio)
University.
^ James Wilson of Pennsylvania read Frarrklin's address to the Convention for
the ailing elder statesman. Madison was given a copy of the manuscript Wilson
read. It can be found in James Madison, "Notes on the Proceedings of the Fed
eral Convention of 1787," The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed.
Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), II, 641-643. Here
after cited as Madison, "Notes," volume and page numbers refer to the Farrand
edition.
^ Among the better known studies are Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at
Philadelphia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966); William Crosskey,
Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1953); Andrew C. MeLaughhn, The Confederation and
the Constitution: 1783-1789 (New York: Collier Books, 1962); Clinton Rossiter,
1787: The Grand Convention (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Robert Sehuyler,
The Constitution of the United States: An Historical Survey of its Formation
(New York: Macmillan, 1923); Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967).
" The most serious attempt made in this direction can be found in Chapter 2 of
Paul Eidelberg, The Philosophy of the American Constitution (New York: The
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in the Convention, and consequently contributed appreciably to the success
of the Convention.
The Rules Committee
On Friday, May 25, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
elected George Washington to preside over their meetings, and then elected
a committee composed of George Wythe, Charles Pinckney, and Alexander
Hamilton, to prepare rules of procedure. The delegates knew that each of
these three men was well prepared for such a task.
George Wythe of Virginia was the committee chairman. Wythe, along
with James Wilson of Pennsylvania, was perhaps the finest legal mind in
the new nation, and certainly in the Convention. Thirty-two years earlier
he had become Attorney-General of Virginia. He served in that position
only briefly, and the following year began his extensive service in the Vir
ginia House of Burgesses and later in the Virginia House of Delegates. Al
though volunteering to serve in the Revolutionary Army, his fellow Vir
ginians instead prevailed upon him to help represent the Old Dominion in
the Continental Congress, where in 1776 he ably supported Richard Henry
Lee's resolution for independence, and signed the Declaration, written
largely by one of his former law students, Thomas Jefferson. During the
war he continued to serve in the Virginia House of Delegates, and with
Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Pendleton was given the massive task of
rewriting all of Virginia's laws, many of which needed alteration and re
vision after the break from England. In 1778 he was appointed to one of
the three positions on the new Virginia High Court of Chancery, and the
following year he was appointed Professor of Law and Police at the College
of William and Mary. This was the first chair of Law in any American col
lege, and from it, according to one biographer, "Wytlre literally charted
the way in American jurisprudence."'' By the time of his election to Vir
ginia's delegation to the Convention, Wythe was recognized as "probably
the foremost classical scholar in Virginia, and was widely read in Roman
and English law."^ Though he was not able to participate extensively in
the three-month Convention, Wythe had long labored for a strong central
government. In the crucial Virginia Ratification Convention, Wythe re
peatedly spoke on behalf of the strong central government created in the
Constitution.
Like Wythe, Charles Pinckney was well grounded in the law. He was ad
mitted to the South Carolina bar at an exceptionally young age, and though
only twenty-nine at the time of the Convention, he had already served in
the South Carolina House of Representatives, and the Congress of Confed
eration. While in this latter body, he had consistently attempted to secure
a stronger federal government. One of the most active speakers in the Con
vention, at least one of Pinckney's biographers suggests that the South
Free Press, 1968). Eidelberg's work, though going beyond the secrecy rules, is
not as complete an examination as this one. He concludes that the rules of the
Convention facilitated "genuine inquiry into questions of political right-questions
of principle as well as policy."
* Remarkably, in light of the existence of many of his papers, decisions, and
other materials, Wythe has not been made the subject of a first-rate biography.
Perhaps the most readily available reliable study of his career is the entry by
Theodore S. Cox in the Dictionary of American Biography, ed. Dumas Malone
(New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), X, 586-589.
° Cox, "George Wythe," Dictionary of American Biography, p. 588.
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Carolinian "had a larger share than any other individual in the determina
tion of the form and content of the finished Constitution."® While such
a remark seems to exaggerate Pinckney's importance, by 1787 Pinckney
had established himself in the front rank of those calling for a stronger gov
ernment.
Alexander Hamilton, today the best known member of the rules com
mittee, had like Wythe and Pinckney, long desired a stronger central gov
ernment. During the Revolution he had served as an aide-de-camp to
Washington. In this capacity he had been involved with Army organiza
tion, and had been exposed to the problems created by the weaknesses of
the Articles of Confederation. As early as September 3, 1780, even before
they had been officially ratified, Hamilton had perceived the fundamental
weakness of the Articles, and begun to call upon his friends to work for
their improvement.'^
In 1781, after only five months of study, Hamilton was admitted to the
New York bar. In private practice, such as in the case of Rutgers vs.
Waddington, when he maintained the superiority of federal laws over those
of the state, Hamilton worked to improve the government. Moreover, si
multaneously, while in Congress, he worked to strengthen the central gov
ernment.
The Constitutional Convention itself was an outgrowth of the Annapolis
Convention of 1786, where Hamilton, with strong support from James
Madison, had convinced the other delegates that they could not accomplish
their task, a reconsideration of the interstate commerce regulations, without
reconsidering the entire fabric of government. Primarily at Hamilton's in
sistence, the Annapolis Convention called upon all the states to send dele
gates to Philadelphia to consider amending the Articles of Confederation.
When the Congress of the Confederation also issued a similar call, the
Constitutional Convention materialized.®
Each of the members of the rules committee was well versed in the law,
and each had served extensively in a wide variety of legislative assemblies.
Most importantly, each recognized the weaknesses of the Articles of Con
federation, and sought to remedy those weaknesses. These men may have
suspected that the Convention might be the nation's last chance to improve
its floundering government. Certainly, these three men wanted the Conven
tion to act, not to delay. They wanted achievement, not indecision. The
rules they established reflect these desires, and facilitated decisive, but
judicious, action.
Rules of The Constitutional Convention
On Monday, May 28th, Wythe reported for his committee. Over the
weekend, they had developed a full set of rules. With one crucial addition,
and a significant deletion, the committee recommendations were adopted.
° J. Harold Easterby, "Charles Pinckney," Dictionary of American Biography,
ed. Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), VII, 611.
'' Letter, Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780, The Papers
of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962), H, 401-402.
® By far the most extensively studied member of the Rules Committee, Hamil
ton has been the subject of numerous biographies. An exceptionally incisive study,
stressing his essential role in the movement for a stronger central government is
John C. Miller, Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (New
York: Harper and Row, 1959). See particularly pp. 83-218.
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The best known rules of the Convention, virtually the only rules men
tioned in most accounts of the proceedings, are the secrecy rules. These
three rules provided
(1) That no copy be taken of any entry on the Journal during the sitting
of the House without the leave of the House.
(2) That members only be permitted to inspect the Journal.
(3) That nothing spoken in the House he printed or otheiwise published,
or communicated without leave.®
The motive for such regulations is clear. The Convention was attempting
to provide for a completely free exchange of ideas. Ceorge Mason of Vir
ginia no doubt summarized the delegates' thinking in a letter written two
days before the secrecy rules were passed.
It is expected our doors will be shut and communications upon the busi
ness of the Convention be forbidden during its setting. This I think my
self a proper precaution to prevent mistakes and misrepresentation until
the business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a
very different complexion from that in which the several crude and in
digested parts might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public
eye."
The secrecy rules would protect the delegates from later being held in
dividually responsible for any comments they might make as debate pro
gressed. Their responsibility would be a collective responsibility, for the
document they produced. Secrecy would insure candor and openness in
debate. The remarks of many of the delegates, particularly those of Hamil
ton, indicate tliat Mason's thinking was typical of the Convention.
Even the press, which might be expected to have been hostile to secrecy
rules, recognized the high purpose behind their passage. The Pennsylvania
Herald told its readers that "we readily admit the propriety of excluding
an indiscriminate attendance upon the discussions of this deliberative coun-
cii "12 -pjjjg vi^as, as the Herald correctly emphasized, a deliberative council.
The secrecy rules reflect the Convention's commitment to honesty and open
ness in its dejiherations.
The secrecy rules are by no means the only rules which facilitated de
cision-making within the Convention. Five additional rules, heretofore vir
tually never examined, particularly warrant our attention.
The Convention decided that "a member shall not speak oftener than
twice, without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second
time, before every other who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he
° Major William Jackson, an associate of Washington's, maintained the official
minutes of the Convention. William Jackson, "Journal of the Federal Convention,"
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1937), I, 5. Hereafter, cited as "Journal," volume and page
numbers refer to the Farrand edition.
" Letter, George Mason to Ceorge Mason Jr., May 27, 1787, The Life of George
Mason, ed. Kate Mason Rowland (New York: Russell and RusseU, 1964), 11,
103-104.
" For Hamilton's comments see his "Reply to Anonymous Charges," The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1937), 111, 366.
^Pennsylvania Herald, June 21, 1787, p. 151.
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choose to speak, upon the subject."^® This rule guaranteed that everyone
would have an opportunity to express his opinion. No group of men would
be able to dominate debate, holding the floor to the exclusion of others. The
Convention was providing that each of its members would have the oppor
tunity to speak on every issue.
But the Convention was not satisfied to simply guarantee that all mem
bers would have the opportunity to speak: several of tlie rules indicate that
the members wished to insure that every speech was presented to an at
tentive audience. At the recommendation of the Wythe Committee, the
delegates decided that "committees do not sit whilst the House shall be,
or ought to be, sitting."!^ Not only would all the delegates be able to speak,
but the work of the Convention would not draw members off the floor.
Committees would never interfere with debate. Moreover, the delegates also
stipulated in their rules that "every member, rising to speak, shall address
the President; and, whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between
them, or hold discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet, or paper,
printed or manuscript."^® Committee work, movements in the room, and
other fonns of distraction, were all being prohibited. The Convention was
committing itself to decisions arrived at by debate, and with these rules it
was clearly attempting to eliminate aU forseeable distractions. Rules of this
nature are rarely, if ever, observed in contemporary legislative assemblies.
Two additional rules indicate the delegates' desire to give their debate
maximum opportunity to exert its effect. The Convention agreed that "the
determination of a question, although fully debated, shall be postponed, if
the deputies of any state desire it, until the next day."^® The delegates were
committing themselves to decisions by debate. But, such decisions can be
made hastily, often under undue emotional pressure brought on by stirring
words. This rule was designed to avoid such decisions. It gave any state
the opportunity to ask the Convention to back off from voting, to thoroughly
consider the question overnight, to avoid undue haste and emotional in
fluences.
Finally at the urging of Richard Spaight of North Carolina, the delegates
added one crucial rule to the recommendations of the Wythe Committee.
As eventually worded, Spaight's recommendation resulted in the adoption
of the rule which stipulated
That a motion to reconsider a matter, which had been determined by a
majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day
in which the vote passed, but otherwise, not without one days previous
notice; in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration some
future day shall be assigned for that purpose."
The importance of Spaight's suggestion cannot be underestimated. Sup
porting his motion, Spaight noted that die Convention should never be
totally precluded from reconsidering an issue. He envisioned such a rule
being used only when members of the Convention saw just cause to re
consider. Spaight recognized that this rule might be used improperly, to
question and delay over decisions already based on "mature discussion."
"Journal," I, 8.
"Journal," I, 16.
"Journal," I, 8.
"Journal," I, 8.
"Journal," I, 16.
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But, he felt that this potential harm had to be risked in order to provide
tlie Convention vi^ith a sure means of reconsidering decisions^® Repeatedly,
the Convention utilized the Spaight addition to the rules. Initial decisions
can be wrong. Subsequent events, greater thought, additional information,
all can alter opinion and fuel new arguments. In approving Spaight's addi
tion, the Convention was committing itself to decision by the highest quality
of debate, regardless of how long it took to achieve that quality.
Finally, one of the rules rejected by the Convention also indicates the
desire of the delegates to maximize the opportunities for fruitful debate.
The Wythe Committee had recommended that any member of the Conven
tion should be allowed to call for the yeas and nays and have them entered
on the minutes.^® Rufus King of Massachusetts and George Mason spoke
against this proposed rule. King objected because he felt that "changes of
opinion would be frequent in tlie course of the business."^" Consequently,
he did not want to bind the members to their prior decisions. Similarly,
Mason added "that such a record of the opinions of members would be an
obstacle to a change of them on conviction, and in case of its being hereafter
promulgated must furnish handles to the adversaries of the result of the meet-
ing."2i No one defended the Committee's recommendation, and this pro
posed rule was rejected. In rejecting this rule, the Convention was again
affirming its desire to let the debates have maximum effect. The members
would not be restrained from reversing their decisions by records of pre
vious votes. Thus, individually and collectively, the rules adopted and re
jected by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention reflect an intense
dedication to allow unrestrained debate to serve as the means of their deci
sion-making.
Conclusions
Soon after the Convention's work was concluded, Washington expressed
his amazement at its success. "It appears to me," the General wrote to his
close friend Lafayette, "little short of a miracle, that the Delegates from so
many different States (which States you know are also different from each
other, in their manners, circumstances, and prejudices), should unite in
forming a system of national Government, so little liable to well founded ob-
jections."23 Washington notwithstanding, the creation of the Federal Con
stitution was not a miracle. That document was wrought by studied delib
eration on the part of delegates who made legislative debate the tool of
their creation. During one of the hottest summers in the history of Phila
delphia, often meeting for five hours or more a day, the delegates debated
almost forty key issues as they created a new form of government.
Yet, theirs were not typical legislative debates. The rules governing the
decision-making process of the Constitutional Convention were unique.
Those rules provided for decisions arrived at through secret debate. Those
rules provided that each delegate would have an equal opportunity to
speak. Those rules provided precautions to prevent distractions, such as
Madison, "Notes," I, 13.
Madison, "Notes," I, 10.
™ Madison, "Notes," 1, 10.
Madison, "Notes," I, 10.
~ Letter, George Washington to Marquis De Lafayette, February 7, 1788, The
Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington; Govern
ment Printing Office, 1939), XXIX, 409-410.
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committee work, from interfering with debate. Those rules provided that
decisions could be made after pausing for an evening of reflection. Those
rules provided that even thoroughly debated and apparently resolved issues
could be reopened for additional consideration. Even in rejecting the pro
posals of its rules committee, the delegates firmly indicated their desire to
allow debate to have maximum effect in forming opinion. Clearly, few of
our current legislative bodies operate with rales such as these.
There have been numerous explanations for the success enjoyed by the
delegates who gathered in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787. The
brilliance of individual members, and indeed the brilliance of the entire
Convention, which Jefferson called "an assembly of demigods" is most fre
quently credited with creating the Convention's success. The dominance of
men firmly committed to a strong federal government, the urgency of the
crisis of government that existed in 1787, and the willingness of the dele
gates to compromise, have all been offered as explanations of the Conven
tion's ability to structure a new government in the face of impending chaos.
All these explanations have merit. Clearly however, any serious attempt to
explain the many factors which contributed to the remarkable achievements
of the Constitutional Convention must also consider the unique rules which
governed the debates of the Convention. Those rules distinguish this body
from other American deliberative assemblies, and established an atmosphere
conducive to sound decision-making.
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NEW DSR-TKA CHAPTER INSTALLED AT EAST
TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY
A new chapter of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha was installed on
tire campus of East Tennessee State University in Johnson City on May 24,
1974 by Dr. Theodore J. Walwik, national secretary.
The student initiates included Ronnie Greer, Reggie Lett, Lloyd Pierce,
"Skip" Carson, Lee Chase, Jerry Henderson, Jerry Waddell, Ken Hill, Alan
Sheets and Carolyn Taylor.
Three faculty members were also initiated, as well as several members of
the administration. Among the faculty initiates were Dr. Paul A. Walwick,
chairman of the speech department. Dr. Richard Dean, chapter sponsor,
and Dr. Valerie Schneider, chapter co-sponsor. Administrators included
Dr. D. P. Gulp, president of East Tennessee State University, Dr. Mack P.
Davis, vice-president for academic affairs. Dr. George N. Dove, dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences, and Dr. Ella V. Ross, dean of students emeritus
and resident member of the university Board of Regents.
Special awards and recognition were accorded Dr. John P. Lamb, dean
of the College of Health, Mrs. D. P. Gulp, wife of the university president,
and Dean Ross for their outstanding forensic skills in seeming the federally-
funded and newly-established College of Medicine. Dean Dove, Vice-
President Davis, and Dr. Walwick were honored for their support of the
university forensics program.
Dr. D. P. Culp, president of East Tennessee State University, receives a national
charter for Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha from Dr. Theodore J. Walwik,
national secretary, at the University Honors Day on May 24, 1974.
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NEWS FROM DSR-TKA CHAPTERS
At Albion, A1 Moore is now serving as director of forensics. The new di
rector of forensics at Creighton is Fr. Marion Stitzmann, who has his Ph.D.
in medieval rhetoric from Southern Illinois.
The Clemson DSR-TKA chapter is an affiliate of the Calhoun Forensic
Union, which each year sponsors the coveted Trustees Medal Competition
and the DSR-TKA Outstanding Speaker awards, given to the best public
addresses presented in an open forum to a panel of judges. These awards
are considered to be two of the highest honors granted at the university. The
director of forensics at Clemson this year is Harold L. Goodall, Jr., and as
sisting with the debate program is Charles DeLancey. Charles Montgomery
is on leave at the University of Florida.
The DePauw debate team again sponsored a student congress in October,
expanded to two days this year.. The topic for legislation was inflation.
Two Florida State graduates, both of whom did a little debating while
undergraduates, competed for the governorship of Florida. Reubin Askew,
the incumbent, won the Democratic nomination with nearly 70% of the vote
and Jerry Thomas received the Republican nomination. (Late flash; Askew
won the election.) On campus, David Cornelius, from the University of
Pittsburgh, serves as graduate assistant in debate, and Marilyn Young, di
rector of forensics, completed her doctorate at the University of Pittsburgh.
Martha Stout Kessler has been appointed director of forensics at George
Washington.
From Hawaii, Jeanne Oka reports that their two-man audience debate
tournament has been well receiyed both by students and local community
groups and school assemblies. The tournament features University of Hawaii
debaters selected from among students enrolled in the argumentation and
debate course. They compete against each other alternating between the
affirmative and negative sides for each round and using the Lincoln-Douglas
format. Audiences judge the debates using a modification of the Woodward
shift-of-opinion ballot. The debates are generally timely, controversial and
informative. They stimulate community interest in the topic and inform
the audiences about the major issues involved.
At Illinois, a parhamentary debate with an international debate team
from New Zealand on the topic, "This House Stands Resolved that the
United States Should Become a Monarchy," climaxed a series of seven major
campus forums which drew an aggregate audience of 1500 persons during
the 1973-74 school year. During the year present and potential DSR-TKA
members participated in 50 public debates before community groups in
Illinois, discussing such topics as the impeachment of Richard Nixon, na
tionalization of U.S. energy industries, and ratification of the equal rights
amendment. The Thomas E. Finfgeld Most Valuable Debater Award for
1974 went to Gail Lovinger, an alternate on the S.C.A.-sponsored debate
team which toured Russia in October of 1974. Chapter president Carl
Fisher is serving as Director of Community Forums and Debates this year.
The Massachusetts chapter expressed its appreciation to all the visitors
to their campus for the DSR-TKA National Conference last spring. The
forensics staff for 1974—75 consists of Ronald J. Matlon, Thomas J. Hynes,
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Marlene G. Fine, Michael McCambridge, Therese Hofmann, and Jean Gau-
mer. About 30 debaters are participating in this year's program. The Most
Outstanding Novice Debate Awards for 1973-74 went to David O'Brien and
John Gross. The Angell Award to the Most Outstanding Senior went to
Tberese Hofmann.
From Mercer, sophomore debater Greg Hammond is serving as a Senate
intern with Sam Ervin during the fall quarter. Alumnus John Winkle has
received a Ph.D. degree from Duke and is teaching at the University of
Texas.
Miami University will host the Region V tournament January 24—26 and
a team of touring Polish debaters on February 25-26, 1975. Robert Kelley,
formerly of Kent State University, will coach individual events this year.
Gharlotte Hoch, formerly of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, is debate
assistant for Gary Turner.
According to sponsor Steve Mudd, the Minnesota chapter has changed
brands of instant coffee from Maxwell House to Hills Brothers, due to the
extreme bitterness of the former and the advantageous cost of the latter.
(Ed. note: I don't know what that is all about, but I sort of expected more
of a systems approach from up there.)
The Nevada chapter of DSR-TKA received the first annual debate schol
arship from the Robert S. Griffin Forensic Association. This association,
composed of alumni of the Nevada forensic programs, was formed to sup
port the Nevada forensics program and was named for Dr. Griffin, pro
fessor emeritus, who was long the director of forensics there and is a Dis
tinguished Alumnus (1968) of DSR-TKA. Recipient of this first scholarship
was Sharon Zadra, a freshman from Reno.
North Carolina alumnus (and former national student president of DSR-
TKA) Joe McGuire reached the final round of moot court competition at
Harvard Law School. Another alumnus. Brent McKnight, was selected as
a Rhodes Scholar to study for two years at Oxford University.
Late flash: Pennsylvania State alumnus Richard S. Schweiker was re-
elected to the United States Senate.
St. Lawrence debater Michael K. Torenza was elected Speaker of the
House for the 1973 New York State Intercollegiate Legislative Assembly
held in the Albany chambers.
Michael K. Torenza
Sr. Lawrence
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The South Dakota chapter started the year with a successful money-
makiug project, selling nearly $700 in raffle tickets. Prizes included gro
ceries, savings bonds, and records. Although the squad is not large this
year, they made a good showing in their first tournament and plans are be
ing made to organize for the campus coUege bowl games.
Susquehanna again hosted their Flying Dutchman Tournament, with
special awards for DSR-TKA schools with the best records.
The Vermont Invitational Tournament will be unique this year as a "no
flow sheet" tournament, in the hope that total impact and persuasive argu
ment can replace the "follow that across your flow sheet" type of debating.
Although Robert Huber was made emeritus professor last spring, he will
continue to coach debate one or two more years. Boston College named
him outstanding debate coach for 1974 and the citation was placed in the
Congressional Record by Congresswoman Margaret Hechler.
The new director of forensics at Virginia is Craig R. Smith, who joined
the program after four years as co-director at San Diego State University.
Michael Shortley is the president of the chapter at Virginia.
At Wabash, Victor Powell has become dean, Joseph O'Rourke is chairman
of the speech department, and James Flynn is the new director of forensics.
Wabash sponsored a debate tournament in November.
Washington and Lee hosted the Region VII DSR-TKA tournament No
vember 9 and 10, with debate and individual events scheduled. The W. W.
Chaffin Memorial Trophy, in memory of Washington and Lee's debate
coach who died returning from a debate tournament, travels to the winning
school team for the season.
Wayne State has established an award in honor of Dr. George V. Bohman,
former chairman of the Department of Speech Communication and Theatre.
The award recognizes outstanding performance in forensic activities.
The Wesleyan chapter has been revitalized in the past year, according to
sponsor James Fuller, and has voted to admit three alumni; Samuel Sara-
cino and Timothy Atwood (both now at the University of Chicago Law
School), and Steven,Torok (in his first year at Harvard Business School).
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TO SPONSORS AND MEMBERS
Pleose send oil communicotions relating Federal Tax. individual key orders odd 50c.
to initioticn, certificates of membership, key The names of new members, those elected
orders, and names of members to the between September of one yeor ond
Notionol Secretary. All requests for September of the following year,
authority to initiate ond for emblems oppeor in the November issue of
should be sent to the Notional Secre- SPEAKER ond GAVEL. According to
tory and should be accompanied by K present regulations of the society, new
check or money order. Inasmuch as members receive SPEAKER and GAVEL
all checks and money orders ore for- for two years following their initiation
worded by the Secretory to the No- if they return the record form sup-
tionai Treasurer, please moke them to: plied them at the time their opplico-
"The Treasurer of Delta Sigma Rho— 'S approved by the Executive Sec-
Tou Koppo Alpho." =^3 retory and certified to the sponsor.
The membership fee is $10.00. |Following this time oil members who
The official key of lOK (size shown wish to receive SPEAKER and GAVEL
in cut on this poge) is $10.50, or the may subscribe at the standard rate of
official keypin of lOK is $11.75. A lapel $5.00 per yeor.
button is ovoilobte for $7.00. Prices include
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
The Delta Sigma Rlio-Tau Kappa Alpha National Council has established
a standard subscription rate of $5.00 per year for Speaker and Gavel.
Present policy provides that new members, upon election, are provided
with two years of Speaker and Gavel free of charge. Life members, further
more, who have paid a Life Patron alumni membership fee of $100, likewise
regularly receive Speaker and Gavel. Also receiving each issue are the cur
rent chapter sponsors and the libraries of institutions holding a charter in the
organization.
Other individuals and libraries are welcome to subscribe to Speaker and
Gavel. Subscription orders should be sent to Allen Press, P. O. Bo.t 368,
LavsTcnce, Kansas 66044.
Now Available
CURRENT CRITICISM
Twenty essays which appeared in the Current Criticism department
of Speaker and Gavel between 1066 and 1970 have been reprinted as
a paperback iwok by Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha.
Tliese studies provide a lively panorama of the significant themes
to which contemporaiy speakers address them.selves. The agonies of
the Vietnam decisions and the emergence of the "black power" issue
strikingly dominate the concenis of speakers and critics alike, but
other issues as well arc given rhetorical analysis in this volume.
Copies of Current Criticism may be obtained for $2.50 from
Theodore Walwik, National Secretary, DSR-TKA, Slippery Rock
State College, Slipper>' Rock, Penna. 16057. They are also available
from the Speech Communication Association, Staller flilton Hotel,
New York. N.Y. 10001.
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